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In The
SUPREME COURT
Of The
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
I

vs.
ISADORE BLEA,
Defendant -Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
10754

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BLEA

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the criminal
conviction of Appellant Isadore Blea on a
charge of "willfully and unlawfully obtaining
a narcotic drug, to-wit:
Deodorized Tincture
of Opium by the use of a false name, to-wit:
Frank Revera . . • " in violation of Section
58-13a-35, Utah Code Anno~ated, 1953.

-2DISPOSITION OF 'l'HE CASE BY LO\\TER COURT
The Appellant was tried by a jury on
August 15, 1966, before the Honorable Leonard
W. Elton.
After having been found guilty by
jury verdict, he was sentenced to be confined
at the Utah State Prison for a term not to
exceed five (5) years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Blea seeks reversal and
for a new trial.

rema~

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 5th day of December,
1965, an individual using the name of Frank
Revera (Tr. 17) entered the office of Dr.
Maitland Spencer, complaining that he and his
family were suffering from diarrhea and were
in need of medication (Tr. 24, 26).
Based
upon that complaint, and Dr. Spencer's medical
judgment, he issued a prescription for treatment of the described malady.
The medication
prescribed was Deodorized Tincture of Opium
(Tr. 26).
There is no testimony or evidence that
the Appellant --- or that individual using
the name of Frank Revera --- requested that
Dr. Spencer give any special type of medication or that the Appellant knew or had any
reason to know the character of the medicati~
pr~scribed.
Likewise, there is no testimony
that Dr. Spencer relied on the allegedly
false name as an inducement for issuing the
prescription, nor is there evidence that the
name Frank Revera was a f alsc name or that
Isadore Blea is the Appellant's true name.
(See Tr. 24 - 33).

-3At the conclusion of the trial the
Court, in its Instruction Number 8 (R: 9) to
the jury, stated the specific elements of
the crime charged.
Neither Instruction
Number 8 nor any other instruction made any
reference to knowledge or intent, or reliance
on the false name by the doctor as elements
which the jury must affirmatively find before
bringing in verdict of guilty, nor was there
any definitive instruction as to the requirement for intent except indirectly and collaterally in a restatement of Section 76-1-20,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, contained in
Instruction Number 9, which provided merely
that 11 •• • • in every crime or public offense
there must be a union or joint operation of
the act and intent. 11 (R. 10)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT ON THE ELEMENT OF
KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT, AND ON THE
NECESSITY FOR A FINDING OF RELIANCE
BY THE DOCTOR ON THE USE OF A FALSE
NAME.
The Appellant on this appeal asserts
the following matters: That the Court wa$
required as a matter of law to instruct the
jury that scienter or knowledge, and ~nten~
are essential elements of the crime of
obtaining a narcotic drug by the use of a
false name; that the failure to so instruct
was prejudicial to the defendant in light of
the evidence and testimony before the jury,
since it is eminently clear from the evidence
Lhctl the jury, if properly instructed, could,
and probably would, have found that the
App,:'1 Lrn t did not know what Dr. Spencer was

-4-

prescribing for him, that he did not intend
to obtain a narcotic drug by the use of a
false name, that the use of a false name
was not an inducement for any course of
action which Dr. Spencer undertood; that
there is no evidence supportive of the jury's
verdict that a false name was used; and that,
finally, the failure of Appellant's counsel
at trial to take exceptions to the instructions,
or to raise the issue of the omitted elements
by way of objection does not preclude the
Appellant from raising the matter on this
appeal.
(a)

Knowledge and intent, and
reliance on the use of a false
name are essential elements of
the crime of obtaining a narcotic
drug by use of a false name, and
as sue~ the Court must instruct
the jury with reTerence to the
same.

Elemental in the tradition of the common
law of crimes is the requirement that before
a crime exists there must be a union or
coalition of actus reas and mens rea. That
is, the act alone is not enough to constitute
a crime but must be accompanied by a mental
element variously described as intent, or
scienter or knowledge. This historical common
law principle has been recognized in general
terms by the Legislature of this state when
it provided in Section 76-1-20, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, that "in every crime or
public offense there must exist the union
or joint operation of act and intent .
"
While the substantive elements of a crime
may be described in different terms depending

-5on the nature of that crime, every crime,
except for certain purely regulatory offenses,
may be described in general terms as consisting
of a proscribed act accompanied by a necessary
mentality.
In the matter presently before the
Court, the Appellant was charged with the
criminal violation of Section 58-13a-35,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
that "no person shall obtain or attempt to
obtain a narcotic drug • . . by the use of
a false name. • • " In its instructions to
the jury, the Court, in Instruction Number 8,
stated that "if the evidence establishes
each and all of the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it
is your duty to find the defendant guilty."
(R. 9)
The elements which the Court stated
were required were only the following:
"(l)
That on or about the 15th
day of December, 1965, that said
defendant obtained a narcotic drug
known as Deodorized Tincture of
Opium.
(2)
That Deodorized Tincture
of Opium is a narcotic drug within
the meaning of the laws of the State
of Utah.
(3)
That said defendant obtained
said narcotic drug by the use of a
false name.
(4)
That the acts took place
within the confines of Salt Lake
county, State of Utah."
(R. 9)

-6There is no statement in that ~pecif ic and
limited summary of the elements as to the
mental element of the crime charged. There
is no statement that the jury must find as
an essential element of the crime charged
that the Appellant intended to obtain a
narcotic drug by the use of a false name
or that he had knowledge of the character
of the drug that he allegedly obtained by
the use of a false· name.
There is no statement that the jury must find that the use
of a false name induced the procurement of
a narcotic drug.
The only reference to intent to be
found at any point in the instructions is
the broad and general statement by the Court
in Instruction Number 9 quoted from Section
76-1-20 as noted above, and this without
any further statement on the part of the
Court which might have aided the jury in
knowing what to do with the fact that "every
crime or public offense requires a union or
joint operation of the act and intent".
Thus, the Court totally failed to give the
jury any guidance with reference to mens
rea as an essential element of the crime
charged.
The cases which have involved sections
of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the provisions of which Utah has adopted, and under
which the Appellant was charged and convicted,
have uniformly held that there is a requirement
of knowledge and/or intent before there is a
violation of the act.
State vs. Winters,
16 Utah 2d 13 9, 3 9 6 Pa. -2d--1r1-2-TI9 6 4) .
People
vs. King, 34 Ill. 2d 199, 215 N.E. 2d 22~

-7(1966); State vs. Ballestros, 100 Ariz. 262,
413 P. 2d 739 (1966); Beasley vs. State, 158
Fla. 824, 30 So. 2d 379 (1947); State vs.
Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24, (1955).
Thus, in State vs. Winters, supra.,
which involved unlawful possession, the Court
stated at 142, 16 Utah 2d that:
"In a prosecution for unlawful
possession of narcotics, the people
must prove that the accused exercised
dominion and control over the drug
with knowledge of its presence and
narcotic character."
(Emphasis
supplied)
In Beasley vs. State, supra., in which
defendant was charged with obtaining narcotics
under forged prescriptions, the Florida Court
stated that:
"Generally, it must be alleged
and shown that (a) the instrument
was forged; (b) that the defendant
knew that the instrument was false
and forged; and (c) that it was
uttered with an intent to injury or
defraud another.
"
(Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of People vs. Martin, 172
P. 2d 910 (Cal. 1946) the Court stated at 911:
"From the several decisions
long followed (citations) the
Supreme Court has recently derived
the rule that the jury must be
convinced that one accused of

-8-

possessing a narcotic found in a
cache on his premises or within
reach of his habitation must have
knowledge of the presence of such
narcotic and -tha-tsuch knowledge
is the essence of the crime of
possession under the narcotic
act."
(Emphasis supplied)
Dy analogy,· the same requirement pertain
for the crime of obtaining by the use of a
false name. Stated another way, the jury must
be convinced that one accused of obtaining a
narcotic by the use of a false name had knowledge of the nature of the medication he was
obtaining and that such knowledge is the
essence of the crime of obtaining.
In People vs. King, supra., involving
the sale of narcotic drugs, the Illinois Court
said that it knew of "
. no case sustaining
a conviction for the unlawful sale of narcotic:
r.d thou t the presence_ of intent.
"
(Emphasis
supplied)
In People vs. Gory, 170 P. 2d 433
(Cal. 1946), a case involving the illegal
possession of narcotic drugs, the California
Court discussed the relationship between the
act of possession and the accompanying mental
element. In reversing the conviction, the
Court stated at 436 that:
"A person has 'possession' of a
chattel who has physical control
with the intent to exercise such
control, or having had such physical
control, has not abandoned it and no
other person has attained possession
. but knowledge of the existence

-9-

of the object is essential to
'physical control thereof with the
intent to exercise such control'.
And such knowledge must necessarily
precede the intent to exercise, or
the exercise of, such control • • •
[I]nstruction 12, as above
quoted in its predication of a
finding of guilt upon the defendant's
knowingly having in his possession
the objects charged in the information should have been given to the
jury. The word 'knowingly' imparts
knowledge that the facts exist which
bring the act or omission within the
provisions of this code.
It does not
require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission. Thus,
Instruction 12 invoked the element
of knowledge in the sense of the
defendant's awareness of the presence
of the marijuana in the box given him
for the storage of his personal effect
at the prison farm and so presented
to the jury an issue of fact determinative of defendant's guilt or
innocence of possession prohibited
by the statute."
(Emphasis is the
Court's)
The foregoing cases deal with the
element of knowledge as related to unlawful
possession. When dealing with unlawful
obtaining, it is patent that the word
"obtaining" contains an element additional
to the "awareness of presence" implicit in
the word "possession". Webster's New
Collr''Jlc:i.te Dictionary, 1960 Edition, states
-E11a-C ohL1in means to "get hold of by effort".

-10Thus "obtaining" carries with it the concept
of more purposeful action than that conveyed
by merely having or possessing, and "obtaining",
unlike "possessing", includes more than just
an awareness of the presence or existence of
the object; it asserts a kno__1_~1=-~dg_e of the
character of the object and an intention to
obtain an-object of that character.
In State vs'. \\/inters, supra., this Court
expressly recognized that knowledge of the
narcotic character of the drug possessed was
an essential clement of possesslon, and if
knowledge of the narcotic character of the
drug is required for the commission of the
crime of possession, then as a minimum, it
must necessarily be required for the commission
of the crime of obtaining.
The evidence in this case affirmatively
snpports the proposition, which proposition
._'ic? _jury could have found below if properly
i,!st.ructed, that the Appellant had no awareness of the presence of the narcotic drug,
had no knowledge of the narcotic character
of the drug which he was obtaining, and had
no intent to obtain a drug of a narcotic
character.
While the Appellant has been unable
to find any cases discussing per se the
required mental element involved in the
unlawful obtaining of a narcotic drug by
the use of false name, an examination of
the facts of this case indicates why knowledge and intent should be required as
~lements of this violation to the same degree
as they have been required for similar
violations as noted above.
The testimony

-11of Dr. Spencer is eminently clear that the
Appellant entered the doctor's office with
the complaint of a common malady, that the
Appellant had asked the doctor what he and
his family might take as a cure for the
malady, and that the doctor gave him a prescription for Deodorized Tincture of Opium
(Tr. 24, 26).
There is absolutely no evidence
or testimony that the Appellant asked for any
particular medication, that he asked specifically for Deodorized Tincture of Opium or
that he knew or had any reason to know the
character of the medication which the doctor
prescribed for the malady.
Additionally, the proscription of the
act of obtaining a narcotic drug by the use
of false name makes little sense unless the
use of the false name is an inducement in
the procurement of the drug. There is no
evidence that the use of the name Frank
Revera induced Dr. Spencer to give this
particular person the particular drug
involved here. As a matter of general law,
the use of a false name is not in and of
itself a criminal or civil violation, and
it is only when the name is used with the
intention of inducing another to do something that he would not do but for the use
of the false name that sanctions are imposed.
Thus, in State vs. Powell, 321 P. 2d 333
(Ore. 1958), involving an unlawful attempt
to obtain a narcotic drug by the use of a
false name and involving facts substantially
similar to the present matter, wherein the
defendant presented herself to the office
of the doctor complainin~ of severe pain in
the abdc:" 1inal area and wherein the doctor
t-h(c'n pi, , r:ribed a narcotic drug 1 the Oregon

-12Court, interpreting the same provision as is
involved here, stated at 338, 321 P. 2d:
"The evidence in this case discloses that the doctor in prescribing
the narcotic to the defendant on the
20th and 23rd of July put no reliance
in the name or aJdress of the
defendant whatsoever, but relied
solely upon' the defendant's representations of her physical condition
and his own examination of her
physical condition. When she returned
on the 25th of July, the doctor did
not refuse her prescription because
of her name or address, but because
he had already prescribed more than
was proper or necessary in the treatment of her condition.
In other
words, the defendant as a person and
not because of name or address
received the very narcotics intended
by the doctor.
Thus, the false name
or address was immaterial.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no evidence in this
case that the defendant attempted
to or did receive narcotics because
of her use of a false name or
address.
The most that can be said
is that she attempted to conceal the
fact of her addiction."
The Court preceded the above statement
by the following interpretation of the Oregon
provision of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act at
337:

-13"The distinction to be drawn
between ORS 474.170, which makes it
a felony to obtain a narcotic by the
use of a false name or the giving of
a false address, and ORS 475.060, a
misdemeanor to use a false name or
give a false address, in obtaining
treatment in which narcotic drugs
are prescribed or dispensed, lies
in the use of the words of the felony
statute 'to obtain a narcotic by the
use of'.
These words must be construed as meaning 'by means of';
that is, the using of the false name
by an accused is a factor in obtaining
or attempting to obtain the drug.
"
See also Wright vs. State, 325 P. 2d 1089
(1958).
It follows then, before one has violated
Section 58-13a-35, that he must have intended
by use of the false name to induce another to
give him narcotics, that he must have known ·
the character of the drug being obtained,
and that, as a matter of fact the false name
served as an inducement in the procurement
of the narcotic drug. Without such a requirement, it would be possible, by the innocent
use of a nick-name, to subject one's self to
a criminal penalty of five years imprisonment.
The State's evidence fails absolutely in
showing that the use of the false name was
an inctucement for Dr. Spencer's action or
that the Appellant knew or had any reason
to know, by going to Dr. Spencer and stating
that he had diarrhea and needed medication
that tho doctor would prescribe a narcotic
<1 r11g.
The question arises, of course, why
J
false name, if any, was used. The answer,

-14-

while irrelevant to any issue involved here,
lies in any number of reasons, one of which
may well have been a desire to avoid a charge
from the doctor for his services which, while
reprehensible in and of itself, does not
constitute a mental element sufficient for
a finding that appellant committed the crime
of obtaining narcotics by use of a false name.
Another, and more subtle reason very well may
have been that a false name was not used at
all and that the Appellant is a victim of
mistaken identity (Tr. 29, 38, 46, 47-48).
In light of the foregoing, the Appellant
submits that the failure of the trial court
to instruct on the element of mens rea was
error which, as shown hereinafter, was prejudicial to the rights of the Appellant.
(b)

Failure to instruct on the
required mental element constitutes prejudicial error
which forms the basis for
reversal and remand for new
trial.

While the Appellant recognizes that
error alone without prejudice to the
Appellant's rights is not sufficient for
the granting of a new trial, it is submitted
that the failure to instruct on the element
of mens rea was prejudicial to the Appellant
since, but for the absence of an instruction
on knowledge and intent, and reliance on
the part of the doctor as essential elements
of the crime charged, it is not only likely,
but is probable, in light of the evidence
before the jury, that the jury could and

-15would have reached a different conclusion
'
and that, consequently, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been
different. This, of course, is the test
for determining the prejudicial effect of
error.
Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631,
237 P. 2d 834 (1951); Hales vs. Peterson,
11 Ut. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961); and
while prejudice is not presumed from extant
error, Drotleff vs. Renshaw, 208 P. 2d 969
(Cal. 1949), it seems to be clear that a
failure to affirmatively instruct the jury
in a criminal matter with reference to the
essential and material elements of knowledge
and int~nt constitutes prejudicial error and
forms the basis for reversal and remand for
new trial.
People v. Garcia, 337 P. 2d 100
(Cal., 1959); State vs. Hus Kenson, 226 P.
2d 779 (Idaho, 1951).
The total paucity of evidence of what ·
the Appellant knew or intended with reference
to the obtaining of the narcotic drug can
lead one to no other conclusion but that the·
result could have been different, as a matter
of reasonable likelihood, had the jury been
properly instructed. On the other hand, the
testimony which was adduced affirmatively
supports the proposition that the Appellant
did not know the character of the drug he
obtained, and that he did not intend to
obtain a narcotic drug.
Thus, Dr. Spencer
testified as follows:
"Q.:

And would you relate
to the jury and to the
Court, please, where it
was that you saw him and
what, if anything, took
place?

-16A.:

He was sitting in my
off ice and he was there
complaining that he and
his family were all ill
and needed some medication.

Q.:

(By Mr. Lewis) All right.
And then, what, if anything,
did you do?

A.:

I gave him a prescription
for some opium, telling
him that the entire family
could use this."
(Tr. 24)

On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer
continued to testify as follows:
"Q.:

.What was the nature
of the ailment defendant
complained of, Doctor?

A.:

He complained that not
only he, but his family,
were suffering from diarrhea
and that they had been out
of town and that they must
have gotten something
either in way of food or
water that the entire
family was sick.

Q.:

So as a result of this
interview you had with
this person, whoever he
might be, you issued a
prescription that we
marked as State's
Exhibit A?

-17A.:

That's correct."

(Tr. 26)

The only inferences which the jury
could draw from the foregoing testimony,
which testimony constitutes the totality
of the State's evidence regarding the
~uestion of knowledge and intent, is that
the Appellant and his family were ill and
were suffering from a malady for which
medication was needed; that the doctor had
a wide choice of medication to recommend
or prescribe, including everything from
Kaopectate to Deodorized Tincture of Opium;
and that without any request on the part of
the Appellant, the doctor determined to
prescribe what just happened to be a narcotic
drug.
With the testimony in this posture,
the jury, if properly instructed, not only
could, but probably would have found that
the Appellant did not know that he was
obtaining a narcotic drug by the use of a
faJse name, but rather, that he was merely
a victim of the doctor's independent medical
decision as to which medication to utilize, ·
which decision was based on diagnosis, and
not request, or reliance on the false name.
It is clear, if the doctor had decided to
recommend Kaopectate as the medication, there
would have been no crime charged here.
It
would be indeed unfortunate to deprive a
citizen of five years of his life as a free
member of society on so slim and fragile an
evidentiary reed as the State has presented
as its total case.
Moreover, the jury had no opportunity
lo consider the elements of knowledge or
intent or to give them weight since the
triaJ court, for all practical purposes, had
'~'.<cl uded Appellant's knowledge and intent

-18and the doctor's reliance on the use of the
false name as necessary elements of the
alleged crime in its Instruction Number 8
to the jury. The trial court's error is
clearly prejudicial to the rights of the
Appellant in this matter since, based on
the testimony before the jury, its verdict
would probably have been quite different
with a proper instruction.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
JURY THAT APPELLANT USED A FALSE
NAME, THAT FRANK REVERA WAS NOT
HIS TRUE NAME OR THAT ISADORE
BLEA WAS HIS TRUE NAME, AND THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY IS THUS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BEFORE
IT.
The State did not adduce nor did it
atb-::r:ipt to adduce any evidence as to the
f aL:;i ty of the name "Frank Revera" so far
as this appellant is concerned. Even viewing
the total testimony in a light most favorable
to the State, it cannot be said that there is
the slightest scintilla of evidence upon
which the jury could have drawn even the
most remote but legitimate inference that
"Frank Revera" was not the true name of
Appellant or that it was, in fact, a false
name, or that Appellant did not commonly
use the name "Frank Revera" or that "Isadore
Blea" was in fact Appellant's true name.
There is no evidence on this point.
In any other matter, where the stakes
are not so high, such a ~ailure to meet one's

-19burden of proof might be dismissed as de
rninimus.
But here, the falsity of the name
is the very essence of the offense. It goes
to the most basic policy reasons behind the
legislative creation of the offense.
The only item the jury had before
it which might imply that "Frank Revera"
was not the Appellant's name is the title
of the case:
"The State of Utah vs.
Isadore Blea". Appellant earnestly submits
to this Court that this does not aid nor
should it be permitted to aid the State in
carrying its burd~n in proving each of the
elements of this crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The only way that the jury could reach
the result i t did was to assume something
that wasn't there, something that it was
not entitled to assume in light of the
evidence before it.
Where "[t]here is not a scintilla of·
evidence in the record to support either the
verdict or judgment, • • • this alone
justified a reversal." Maloy vs. Griffith,
240 P. 2d 923 (Colo., 1952). Appellant
urges this Court to reverse and remand for
a new trial.
POINT III.
FAILURE OF APPELLANT AT THE TRIAL
BELOW TO OBJECT OR EXCEPT TO THE
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM
NOTICING ERROR AND. REMANDING FOR
NEW TRIAL.

-20While Appellant recognizes the existence
of the general rule that in criminal matters,
as well as in civil matters, failure to take
exception to the Court's instructions does
not preserve on appeal those items to which
exception might have been taken but was not.
It is submitted, however, that the above rule
is of general application only and is subject
to the following exceptions, which pertain
here.
Thus, in State vs. Peterson, 121 Utah
229, 240 P. 2d 504 (1952), this Court stated
that:
"
• . where instructions are
palpably erroneous to such an extent
that they would if, followed by the
jury, prevent a fair or proper
determination of the issues, we
may notice the error without
exception having been taken."
To the same effect is this Court's
holding in State vs. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.
2d 952 (1936) where it was stated at 958 P.
2d:
"We recognize the well-settled
general rule in this and in other
jurisdictions that alleged errors
with respect to instructions and
in refusing requests to instruct
ordinarily will not on appeal be
considered or reviewed, unless
sufficient exceptions thereto were
taken in the Court below by the
party agreed.
Such rule, however,
is not uniform as to all errors so
committed.
In many jurisdictions

-21there are well-recognized
exceptions to the general rule,
especially in criminal cases
involving capital offenses or
other grave and serious offenses
of long-term imprisonment and
sometimes has been applied even
in civil cases where palpable
error on the face of the record
involved violations of fundamental
rights and privileges of manifest
prejudice to the party agreeing • • •
In capital cases, the Court may
take notice of errors apparent
on the record affecting the substantial right of the prisoner
on his trial, although not
made a ground of appeal
(citations)
We do not wish to depart from
the rule laid down in this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on
appeal, errors relating to instructions or refusing requests to
instruct will not be considered
or reviewed unless exceptions
thereto were properly taken by
the parties complaining. In
capital cases and in cases of grave
and serious charged offenses and
convictions of long terms of
imprisonment, cases involving the
life and liberty of the citizen,
we think that when palpable error
is made to appear on the face of
the record and to the manifest
prejudice of the accused, the Court
has the power to notice it there
and to correct the same, though
no formal exception was taken to

-22the ruling.
In these days of
widespread advocacy a reformed
procedure in criminal cases to
heal and cure misgivings and
faulty prosecutions the safeguards of the rights and privileges
of the accused should not be overlooked and a loose reign held for
the prosecution and a tight,
technical, ctnd restricted reign
held on the accused."
(Emphasis
is the Court's)
Finally, in State vs. Waid, 92 Utah
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937), the Court stated
at 309, 92 Ut.:
"We are most earnestly urged by
counsel for defendant in their brief
and oral argument to notice the error
and correct it, notwithstanding no
exceptions thereto were taken in
the Court below by the agreed party.
Where plain and palpable error
shows on the face of the record with
respect to instructions given or
refused, we have the authority so
to do.
In such a case, the State
has no right to hold the judgment,
and we think it is the clear duty
of the Court to notice the error
and correct it.
(citation)
The rule has been applied in
capital cases and in cases of
grave and serious offenses involving long terms of imprisonment.
In the case at hand, the defendant
was found guilty of but simple
assault. Counsel urged upon us
that the charge made against
defendant was of such a nature

-23that if proved would bring him
into public contempt and disrepute
of great compensity. A conviction
of simple assault under such a
charge partakes of a nature of a
graver offense and entails the
loss of friends and the respect
of fellows.
The error committed
prevented his having a fair trial.
We think, therefore, that we
should notice the error, reverse
the judgment and remand the cause
for a new trial • • • "
The Appellant submits that in the
present case there is palpable error appearing
on the face of the record which manifestly
prejudices the Appellant and prevented his
having a fair trial on the offense charged,
a conviction of which offense most certainly
brings him into public contempt and disrepute
and entails the loss of friends and the
respect of fellows.
For the foregoing
reasons, the Appellant urges that this Court·
notice the error, reverse the judgment and
remand the cause for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS &
LATIMER
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